According to earlier research, distributed decision support structures are susceptible to deception. We complement the existing works by analyzing group members' attempts to manipulate group decisions supported by distributed communications. Experimentally, we manipulated two systemic features of a distributed support structure: the members' information asymmetry and decision rule complexity. Both of these features refer to structural properties of aggregated information exchange. We confirmed several hypothesized effects: An increase in the information asymmetry in the aggregation of information increases the incidence of the members' manipulative tendency. It also increases the effectiveness of the members' manipulative imputations. However, the complexity of a decision rule negatively moderates both of these effects. We point out the theoretical relevance and managerial implications of our findings. We conclude that managing team members' information asymmetry and complexity of issues under their practical consideration may result in valuable disclosures.
As the unique characteristics of the Internet (e.g. its low entry barriers, spatial/temporal separation, and anonymity) facilitate deceptive acts, such acts have largely been examined in the context of e-commerce (Pavlou & Gefen, 2005; Xiao & Benbasat, 2011) . Nonetheless, recent studies have also started to examine deceptive acts within group decision support system (GDSS) settings. Examples of the latter include the study of deception in corporate prediction markets (O'Leary, 2015) and online preference markets, i.e., virtual markets established to collect participants' preference on virtual stocks representing items of interest (Chen et al., 2013) . Earlier GDSS works have stressed the need to examine deceptive acts in GDSS settings, given that "the decisions that are guided by the GDSS may only be as good as the information that is exchanged" (Barkhi et al., 1998 , p. 223).
Our study largely seeks to contribute to this line of research by providing a better understanding of the antecedents behind the genesis of deceptive acts in GDSS. As we also illustrate in the next section, a number of studies examined several factors that make individuals more susceptible to deception (Biros et In light of the above, the focus of this paper is to understand how systemic GDSS features may inhibit or motivate an individual group member to impute inauthentic information.
Our study examines such imputations during instances of information aggregation, as the pooling of information over many individuals making a group decision is referred to (Bettencourt, 2009; Csaszar & Eggers, 2013) . In particular, it examines the effects of two systemic GDSS features on the group member's tendency to deceive: 1) the presence of information asymmetries during the aggregation of information, and 2) the complexity characterizing this aggregation.
The difference between the information transacting parties possess, known as information asymmetry (Ba & Pavlou, 2002) , has been identified as a likely predictor of deceptive acts (Barkhi et al., 1998 (Barkhi et al., , 2004 ). In addition, regulative effects may suppress biased information exchange (Silver, 2014) . Therefore, under conditions of information asymmetry, the complexity of a rule that determines how imputations are aggregated into a group outcome may differentially impact the exchange of inauthentic information.
Our study examines the effects of information asymmetry and decision rule complexity on the incidence of a group member submitting inauthentic information. In addition, we complement our analysis by examining the effectiveness of a group member's manipulative imputations on a supported group decision. The latter, while important, has been implicitly assumed. Hence, findings of this study initially inform GDSS researchers and practitioners on how one systemic feature, i.e. the asymmetry of information, may promote a deceptive act.
Moreover, our study also illustrates the interplay between these two systemic features, influencing the group member's tendency to deceive. Specifically, it shows how the setting of a decision rule under conditions of information asymmetry can suppress an individual's submission of inauthentic information.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: in the following section, we provide a brief overview of the findings on deception, and suggest how this applies to GDSS settings. In the subsequent section, we develop our hypotheses. In the fourth and fifth section, we explain our methodology and results. We then discuss our findings, research contributions, and managerial implications, and conclude the paper.
Related Prior Works

Deception and Technology
The previous works on the relationship between technology and deception followed two closely related research streams. One stream investigated characteristics that make individuals susceptible to deception. Urgency cues, habitual media use, and high email load play an important role in this susceptibility (Vishwanath et al., 2011) . The credibility of a sender is also an important factor (George et al., 2014) .
The other stream investigated characteristics that assist deception detection, by strengthening users' vigilance (Jarvenpaa & Majchrzak, 2010) . Warnings about data quality combined with just-in-time training enhance deception detection (Biros et al., 2002) . However, this comes at the cost of a user's evaluation time, and can increase the number of false alarms (Biros et al., 2002) . Proposals have also been made for automated deception detection (Zhou et al., 2004) . Recently proposed credibility assessment systems are capable of detecting individuals' purposely hidden information (Twyman et al., 2014) . These systems synthesize the understanding of orienting and defensive responses, structured interviewing, and non-invasive psychophysiological and behavioral measurements (Twyman et al., 2014) . Whereas many promising methods can assist deception detection, selecting valuable input variables remains unavoidable in enhancing their performance.
In spite of these important findings, little is known about how individuals appropriate technology features to deceive. Our study aims to address this important research gap.
Specifically, we investigate how technology features cause individual group members to submit inauthentic information.
Deception in GDSS settings
Studies of deceptive acts in GDSS settings compared collocated groups and groups supported by distributed communications. Group members supported by distributed communications revealed their information less truthfully than collocated group members (Barkhi et al., 1998) . This difference persisted even if the groups did not have a leader (Barkhi et al., 2004) . Further, a recent study investigated the incidence of deception and the success of deceivers in influencing group decisions (Marett & George, 2013) . Across the board, the group members were abysmally poor at detecting lies submitted during group sessions (Marett & George, 2013) .
Deceivers lied more if their group members were supported by distributed communications.
However, they were significantly more successful in influencing group decisions if their group members were collocated (Marett & George, 2013) . A recent numerical analysis showed that regulative effects in distributed GDSS settings suppressed the bias of group members' information exchange (Silver, 2014) .
Our study focuses on distributed GDSS settings that encourage the submission of inauthentic information. However, rather than comparing the physical features of GDSS settings (distributed communications vs. collocated groups) like these previous studies, our study examines effects of the systemic features common to the distributed communications. One such feature is the presence of information asymmetries during the aggregation of information (Barkhi et al., 1998) . The other is the decision rule complexity that characterizes this aggregation (Silver, 2014 ).
In bilateral settings, a general requirement for a deceptive act to be effective is that deceiving signals generated by a deceiver reach the other party, and affect a decision outcome (Li & Cruz, 2009 ). Only if the deceiver believes that manipulated information will affect the other party, will he/she opt to manipulate this information in his/her favor. Moreover, in GDSS settings, it is typically understood that the information necessary for a supported group decision to be made is distributed among group members. Thus, a supported group decision will be generally susceptible to every group member's imputed information.
In light of this condition, the GDSS settings beg two main questions: First, how to prevent a group member from imputing inauthentic information? Second, how to suppress the effectiveness of this imputation on a supported group decision? Our study addresses both of these questions.
Theory and Hypotheses
By-and-large, decision-making consists of information managing behaviors, i.e. the search for and processing of information, and evaluation and implementation of options (Csaszar & Eggers, 2013; Gavetti et al., 2007; Simon, 1972 Simon, , 1997 . Intuitively, more information reduces uncertainty, and can lead to a better payoff. The value of this information is usually defined through the induced payoff difference (Feltham, 1968; Howard, 1966) . Many deceptive acts draw on the 'informational leverage' held over decision-making parties (Clots-Figueras, et al. 2015) .
Such an imbalance is commonly referred to as information asymmetry.
Information asymmetry pervades distributed GDSS structures (Barkhi et al. 1998 ). This fact has led to hypothesizing that information asymmetry can be a key predictor of deceptive acts in a distributed GDSS structure (Barkhi et al. 2004 ). Siding with this argument, our study treats information asymmetry as a dynamic notion that can increase or decrease during an exchange of information, and in our case during its aggregation. A thorough understanding of these effects on deception requires an examination of changes in information that aggregates into a group outcome.
Our overarching hypothesis is that increased information asymmetry among group members will lead to a higher number of deceptive acts. If the pooled information on other members' preferences is disclosed to an individual member, this disclosure reduces his/her uncertainty (Li & Cruz, 2009 ). In addition, the disclosure of their conflicting incentives reveals to the individual member an opportunity to exploit his/her 'informational advantage.' The member responds to this opportunity, by manipulating information, thereby changing a group outcome, and improving his/her payoff (Volz et al., 2015) . In other words, the increase in this asymmetry may increase the incidence of the member's attempted manipulation. Accordingly, we hypothesize:
H1a: An increase in information asymmetry during the aggregation of information increases a group member's manipulative tendency.
As already stated, an increase in information asymmetry occurs by providing the member with the information on the remaining members' conflicting incentives. Besides disclosing to the member the opportunity to manipulate group outcomes, this also informs the member of the likely consequences of his/her imputations. Specifically, such a disclosure informs the member of an imputation that may lead to group outcomes more favorable to him/her. Hence, an increase in information asymmetry should also cause the member's manipulative imputation to be more effective. Therefore, we hypothesize:
H1b: An increase in information asymmetry during the aggregation of information increases the effectiveness of a group member's manipulative imputation.
Either implicitly or explicitly, group decisions require a decision rule. Any such rule structures the aggregation of imputed information into a group outcome (Bettencourt, 2009 ). The simplest decision rule may require each group member to impute only a single preference (i.e. "Among options a, b, and c, I prefer option b."). A more complex rule may require each group member to impute exhaustively ordered preferences (i.e. "Among options a, b, and c, I prefer options b, a, and c, in that order."). An even more complex rule may require each group member to characterize his/her intensity of preferences across an imputed ordering (i.e. "Among options a, b, and c, I prefer option b three times more than option a, and option a two times more than option c."). Obviously, the rules differ in the richness of information each member is required to impute. In addition, they also differ in the complexity of the aggregation of imputed information (Bettencourt, 2009; Endriss et al., 2012) . We argue that this complexity may affect the relationship between the information asymmetry and deception.
Simple rules are known to positively influence group outcomes (Limayem et al., 2006) . After all, the complexity of a decision rule is inversely related to the efficiency of information processing (Conitzer & Sandholm, 2005; Xia & Conitzer, 2010) . As implied by the principle of bounded rationality, this complexity taxes an individual's information processing ability (Adler et al., 2011; Gigerenzer & Goldstein, 1996; Simon, 1972) . Hence, the more complex the rule, the lower is the efficiency of the individual group member's information processing. This consideration also applies to the efficiency of the member's manipulative responses to any disclosed opportunity. As previously explained, the increase in information asymmetry about the other members' conflicting incentives discloses to the member the opportunity to manipulate group outcomes. This incentivizes the group member to manipulate information, thereby changing a group outcome, and improving his/her payoff. Nonetheless, if this complexity makes the member's information processing less efficient, he/she may also be less likely to respond to this opportunity. Hence, we hypothesize: H2a: The decision rule complexity negatively moderates the effect of information asymmetry on a group member's manipulative tendency.
The inverse relationship between the complexity of a decision rule and efficiency of information processing also applies to the effectiveness of the group member's manipulative imputation. The disclosure of the remaining members' conflicting incentives informs the member's evaluation of his/her imputations. The disclosure of the opportunity to favorably manipulate group outcomes makes the member more likely to do so. However, the decision rule complexity taxes the efficiency of the member's information processing. This processing includes the member's selection of a manipulative imputation that favorably manipulates a group outcome.
Thus, the more complex the rule, the lower is the effectiveness of the member's manipulative imputation. Accordingly, we hypothesize:
H2b: The decision rule complexity negatively moderates the effect of information asymmetry on the effectiveness of a group member's manipulative imputation. 
Participants and Experiment Design
Our hypotheses were tested in a lab experiment. Our 120 participants were graduate students from a university in Central Europe. Their mean age was 24.41 (standard deviation = 4.49). Fifty-nine participants were female (49%) and sixty-one were male (51%). All the participants took part in nine decision scenarios. Each scenario assumed the existence of six other imaginary group members. Our treatment was the increased information asymmetry in the aggregation of information (low vs. high asymmetry). Our moderator was the decision rule complexity (low vs. moderate vs. high rule complexity). Since people differ in their tendency of becoming informed (Goldberg, 1993; Northouse, 2007) , information asymmetry was varied between-participants. On the other hand, the same people may experience different decision situations. Thus, the decision rule complexity was varied within-participants. Finally, our dependent variables were the manipulative tendency and effectiveness of manipulative imputation.
Pretesting the Decision Scenarios
Initially, we devised a number of decision scenarios. Our rationale was for each scenario to consist of a specific decision rule and a specific preference arrangement. The previous analyses participants were invited to the second pretest round. This round confirmed that the embedding was done effectively. However, some of the descriptions strongly interfered with the participants' attitudes (for instance, an attitude toward the death penalty). After the subsequent modifications, nine scenarios remained. A vacation, a sports club, a donation, team building, and an evening outing were retained as social settings. In addition, a small business, a candy distribution, a corporate board, and an investment were retained as business settings. Eventually, we invited another 10 participants for the third pretest round. Their reports suggested the linguistically formulated variables were effective. In turn, their self-reports indicated they voted tactically whenever they could.
Variables
The Treatment:
The participants in our control group only knew their assigned preferences and no one else's. Being informed about the six imaginary members' preferences, the participants in the experiment group were exposed to the increased information asymmetry. Our treatment was coded accordingly: the control group (low asymmetry = 0) or the experiment group (high asymmetry = 1) (Please refer to Appendix A for the difference in the scenarios between the two groups). . Notably, the simplest rule is the simple majority (Messner & Polborn, 2004) . This rule has each participant impute a preference for a single option. An outcome is an option that receives more than half of all the members' votes. A more complex rule is the rank vote. This rule has each participant impute a preference ordering (Islam et al., 2011; Saari, 2001 ). An outcome is an option that receives most group members' first rank. Finally, an even more complex rule is the point method (Guinier, 1994; Siegler & Talel, 2005) . This rule has each participant distribute an equal number of points across all options. Such a distribution accounts for the intensity of their preferences. An outcome is an option with the greatest sum of group members' points. Accordingly, our moderator was coded as low complexity (simple majority: rule = 0), moderate complexity (rank vote: rule = 1), or high complexity (the points method: rule = 2). (Please refer to Table 1 for the scenarios with their respective rules).
The Moderating Variable
The Dependent Variables:
Earlier studies specified a deceptive act as a claim that diverges from a standard discussion script (George & Marrett, 2004 ). An act of effective deception was specified as a discussant convincing the group to accept an option that the discussant did not sincerely prefer (Marrett & George, 2013). We specified the participant's manipulative imputation as his/her support for an option that is not preferred in accordance with the assigned preferences (Sobel, 2001; Taylor, 2002 Taylor, , 2005 . Correspondingly, the first dependent variable was coded as an authentic (the most preferred imputation; inauthentic = 0) or inauthentic imputation (not the most preferred imputation; inauthentic = 1). The participants were prompted to impute their preferences. By calculating consequent group outcomes, we specified the effectiveness of an inauthentic imputation. Hence, the second dependent variable was coded as an ineffective (an inauthentic imputation that does not preclude a less preferred outcome; effective = 0) or effective manipulative imputation (an inauthentic imputation that precludes a less preferred outcome; effective = 1). Finally, all possible outcomes were combined into a third dependent variable. This variable was coded as an authentic imputation (manipulate = 0), ineffective manipulative imputation (manipulate = 1), or effective manipulative imputation (manipulate = 2). Table 1 ), the basic setting type was coded as a business (setting = 0) or social setting (setting = 1).
The Control
Moreover, our fifth control variable accounted for the remaining variability in the nine scenarios.
These nine scenarios were coded as dummy variables: a vacation club (scenario = 1), a sports club (scenario = 2), a corporate board (scenario = 3), a small business (scenario = 4), donations (scenario = 5), candy distributor (scenario = 6), investment (scenario = 7), team building (scenario = 8), or evening outing (scenario = 9). To avoid a possible sequential effect, the participants' sequential exposure to these scenarios was randomized. Our final control variable accounted for the participants' familiarity with the scenarios. After each scenario, the participants responded to: "Did your preference in real life affect your choice in this scenario?" Their responses were coded on the Likert scale from "certainly not" (familiarity = 1) to "certainly yes"
(familiarity = 7). 
Complexity of a decision rule
Manipulation Checks
If measured simultaneously, the manipulation checks could interfere with the measurement of our dependent variable. Therefore, for the manipulation checks we chose another independent sample of 27 pretest participants. Testing the effectiveness of the increased information asymmetry, we presented the participants with the nine decision scenarios. They were asked to pinpoint an opportunity of precluding their less desirable group outcomes. Then we tested the difference between the expected and observed distributions of their correctly detected opportunities across all the scenarios. χ 2 pointed to no difference between them (χ2 = 11.259, d. f. = 8, p = 0.1874, n = 27). The pretest participants correctly detected all such opportunities. Thus, our treatment was effective.
Further, testing the effectiveness of the decision rule complexity, we asked these pretest participants to rank the rules for their complexity. Their ranks were to range from the least over moderately to most complex rule. Specifically, they were expected to rank the simple majority as the least complex rule, the rank vote as the moderately complex one, and the point method as the most complex one. Then we tested the difference between the expected and observed distributions of their ranks. χ 2 pointed to no difference between these distributions (χ2 = 2.741, d.
f. = 2, p = 0.254, n = 27). Therefore, our moderating variable was also effectively manipulated.
Experiment Procedure
Our participants (120 graduate students from a university in Central Europe) were assigned to their respective computer booths in a laboratory. They were randomly assigned to the control or experiment group. They were presented with on-screen instructions, instructing them to read each scenario and impute their information. Their exposure to the scenario sequences was also randomized. They were instructed to impute what for them constitutes a favorable outcome.
All the responses were collected automatically. On average, the experimental group took 57 minutes, and the control group took 43 minutes to complete the assignment. Finally, the participants' anonymity was guaranteed, and their participation was compensated. 
Results
Descriptive Statistics
2 Main Analyses
Given our categorical measure, we initially employed a logistic regression. As stated previously, the first dependent variable is specified as an authentic (inauthentic = 0) or inauthentic imputation (inauthentic = 1). The second dependent variable is specified as an ineffective (effective = 0) or effective manipulative imputation (effective = 1). Table 4 Finally, we ran multinomial regressions on the third dependent variable. This variable was specified as an authentic (manipulate = 0), ineffective manipulative (manipulate = 1), or effective manipulative imputation (manipulate = 2). Table 5 shows the results of the multinomial regression analyses. Statistical significance at *: 95%, **: 99%, ***: 99.9% Table 5 . The effects on manipulative imputations (the authentic imputation is the baseline; standard errors are in the parentheses)
The results in Table 5 are generally consistent with the results in Table 4 . The multinomial analyses entirely support H1a and H1b, and partially support H2a and H2b. While the former two hypotheses are quite straightforward, the latter two require a further explanation.
Essentially, H2 posits that rule complexity negatively moderates the effect of increased information asymmetry on the tendency to submit inauthentic information and the effectiveness of manipulative imputation. In the situation of high information asymmetry, if the decision rule is the least complex, the individual group member is more likely to impute inauthentic information the most complex rule, the participant is more likely to impute inauthentic information (beta low asymmetry * point method = 1.043, standard error = 0.278). Nonetheless, he/she is unlikely to be effective at favorably manipulating a group outcome. In this situation, we see the evidence of a chance behavior. Since the decision rule is so complex, even without knowing the other group members'
preferences, an individual is tempted to manipulate a group outcome, by taking a chance on this.
The next section presents a more detailed discussion of the findings.
Discussion
Individuals may attempt deceiving acts within group settings. They are more likely to do this if their groups are supported by distributed communications (Barkhi et al., 1998 (Barkhi et al., , 2004  Marrett & George, 2013). However, the effectiveness of their attempts on supported group decisions has not been clear (Marrett & George, 2013) . In line with these findings, we subjected the group members' manipulative attempts to the impact of the two systemic features of distributed support. Our study examined how information asymmetry and rule complexity influence the group member's manipulative tendency and its effectiveness on supported group decisions.
Providing information on the other members' conflicting incentives increases the group member's manipulative tendency. Given the simple decision rule, doing so also increases the effectiveness of the member's manipulative imputation. As the decision rule is made more complex, the inability to cope with the additional complexity burdens the member's manipulative tendency. Interestingly, a feature of a decision rule may give the member an option to 'stake the odds,' by imputing inauthentic information. The member is likely to take this chance, even if he/she does not have any information about the other members' preferences. Specifically, the most complex rule in our experiment, i.e. the point method, requires from each participant to distribute a pre-specified number of points across all possible options (e.g., "Among options a, b, and c, I prefer option b three times more than option a, and option a two times more than option c"). Such a distribution accounts for the intensity of the member's preferences. An outcome is an option with the greatest sum of all the group members' points. Without knowing the preferences of the other members, our participants overemphasized the intensity of their authentic preferences. They did so in a bid to assure the group outcome that is more favorable to them.
However, without knowing the other members' preferences, simply 'staking the odds' turned out ineffective. Despite the ineffectiveness, this finding additionally points to the susceptibility of systemic GDSS features to manipulative imputations.
Our other findings concern control variables. While the social value orientation increases the participants' tendency to impute inauthentic information, it reduces the effectiveness of their 
Research Contributions
Our study makes a number of important research advances. First, we holistically examined the incidence and effectiveness of the group member's manipulative influences over supported group decisions. Earlier works mainly focused on the incidence, while ignoring the effectiveness. Our findings thus enrich the existing GDSS literature, and are an important stepping stone toward future studies that delve deeper into the effectiveness of manipulative imputations in distributed GDSS settings.
Second, most GDSS studies (e.g., Barkhi et al., 1998 Barkhi et al., , 2004 ) compared the group members' exchange of inauthentic information between different physical features of GDSS settings (i.e., distributed versus collocated). Their common finding is that the exchange of inauthentic information is more prevalent in a distributed GDSS setting. Our study delved deeper into the distributed GDSS setting by examining the effect of two systemic features, i.e., information asymmetry and decision rule complexity, on an individual member's tendency to impute inauthentic information. By eliminating the group member's interactions with the other group members, we eliminated the potential social considerations that may emerge from such interactions (i.e., we presented the experiment participants with six other imaginary group members). By doing so, we isolated the effects of the systemic GDSS features on the group member's manipulation tendency and its effectiveness. Future studies can build on our findings, by introducing and manipulating the social aspects, e.g., conducting an experiment with the group members being the participants' friends versus strangers. On the one hand, there is the inconsistency between the participants' surveyed and true preferences, as revealed during and/or after participation. Notably, up to 27% participants misstate their true preferences (Chen et al., 2013) . In other words, the influence of information aggregation on stated preferences points to the inaccuracy of their disclosure. On the other hand, information traders who trade on specific information in a prediction market are themselves subject to information asymmetries (O'Leary, 2015). By affecting the information aggregation efficiency, the transparency of contributed information impedes such trading behaviors, rather than enticing them (Yang et al., 2015) . Therefore, our findings strengthen the insight that less transparent information opens the door for deceptive acts. However, more research is needed on institutionally structured arrangements that minimize deception, and encourage trust facilitating exchanges.
Implications for Practitioners
Opportunities to assure a more desirable or preclude a less desirable group outcome incentivize team members' manipulative behaviors. If there are competing interests on a manager's team, he/she can suppress or decrease the effectiveness of the members' attempted manipulations. A straightforward approach is for the manager to deprive any team member of knowledge of the other team members' competing interests. An alternative approach relies on the complexity. This complexity should be understood as the complexity of the team members' manipulation calculus. This complexity can also suppress or decrease the effectiveness of the team members' attempted manipulations: for example, the manager can make the interdependence of the team members' competing interests more ambiguous. This would result in the team member's more authentic information disclosures. Thus, if issues under consideration are more complex, this will naturally result in their more authentic disclosures, due to the complexity of manipulation calculus.
In short, our advice is for managers to be well informed on issues reflecting the interdependence of their team members' competing interests. We advise them to cultivate the sensibility not only to the team members' manipulative imputations, but also to their more general information-managing behaviors. Such knowledge may also improve the design of GDSS features that prevent manipulative imputations. In this respect, the more cogent understanding of the susceptibility of a distributed support structure to such imputations is our contribution to the analysis and design of GDSS. composed of seven members, and is to vote on whether to make a donation to a political campaign, institution of fine arts, or charitable event. Everyone will rank the donations, and submit their rankings to the vote. You prefer the institution of fine arts to the charitable event.
You do not want to contribute to the political campaign. These other six members would give 1 third rank, 2 second ranks, and 3 first ranks to the political campaign, 4 third ranks and 2 second ranks to the fine arts, and 1 third rank, 3 first ranks, and 2 second ranks to the charitable event.
Please rank the three donations. Please do so by choosing 1, 2, or 3 next to each of them. A donation to receive the most first ranks wins.
The Charitable Event: __. T he Institution of F Table 1 .
